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CASENOTES
HAVE COURTS INTRUDED ON FIRST AMENDMENT
GUARANTEES IN THEIR ZEAL TO ENSURE
THAT CRIME DOES NOT PAY?
I. INTRODUCTION
The enormous success of the book Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia Fam-
ily' ("Wiseguy") led to the creation of a film version entitled GoodFel-
las.2 Both the novel and the movie resulted from publisher Simon &
Schuster's hiring convicted organized crime figure, Henry Hill ("Hill"),
and exploiting the notoriety of his various crimes.' Among the more
infamous crimes Hill took part in "were the theft of nearly six million
dollars in cash and jewelry from the Lufthansa terminal at Kennedy Air-
port and the bribery of Boston College basketball players."4 Although
Hill served brief prison terms, he was prosecuted for only a few of the
crimes he admitted committing.5 Instead, Hill entered the Federal Wit-
ness Protection Program, became an informant, and in return, was given
a new identity.6
Allowing criminals to financially profit from the notoriety of their
crimes has frequently generated considerable public hostility.7 In 1977,
residents of New York City were disturbed at the likelihood that killer
David Berkowitz, better known as "The Son of Sam,"' would profit from
his crimes by selling the rights to his story to publishers for a large sum
of money.9 Consequently, citizens persuaded a sympathetic New York
1. N. PILEGGI, WISEGUY: LIFE IN A MAFIA FAMILY (1985).
2. (Warner Bros. 1990); Court Upholds Curbs on Criminal's Profits, Wall St. J., Oct. 4,
1990, at B5, col. 1. See also N.Y.L.J., Oct. 4, 1990, at 1, col. 5.
3. N.Y.L.J., Oct. 4, 1990, at 1, col. 5.
4. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 779 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 59
U.S.L.W. 3546 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1991)(No. 90-1059) [hereinafter "Simon & Schuster I1"].
5. Id.
6. Id
7. Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1990, at B5, col. 1.
8. David Berkowitz terrorized New York City for over a year with random shootings of
young women and their escorts that left six people dead and seven people wounded. Fedler,
When Headlines Are Bought, BARRISTER, Fall 1980, at 14.
9. See Memorandum of Emmanuel Gold, the law's sponsor, infra note 53. As the cap-
ture of David Berkowitz became imminent, it became public knowledge that publishers were
offering large sums of money for the rights to his story. N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1977, at 1, col.
6.
LOYOLA ENTER TAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
state legislature to act to prevent such an injustice.' 0 New York was thus
the first state to institute such a statute, New York Executive Law sec-
tion 632-a ("section 632-a"), commonly known as the "Son of Sam"
law." In response to the growing legislative concern over criminals prof-
iting from their crimes, thirty-nine states, 12 as well as the federal govern-
ment,' 3 have enacted similar statutes. Most of this legislation was
modeled after New York's section 632-a. 4 The objective of these Son of
Sam statutes is clear and unambiguous: when criminals derive profits
from recounting their crimes in books, films, magazine articles, or other
expressive media, these profits should be made available to the victims as
a source of compensation.' 5
Many people agree with the purposes behind the Son of Sam law
and those statutes modeled after it. However, these statutes in their cur-
rent form restrict speech based on content. Because there are available
alternatives which could accomplish the legislative goal without focusing
on the content of the criminal's speech, these laws in their present form
violate the first amendment to the United States Constitution. 16 Any mi-
10. Simon & Schuster A1, 916 F.2d at 782-83.
11. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990), infra note 50. The consti-
tutionality of section 632-a was upheld by a New York state court in the matter involving
David Berkowitz. Matter of Johnson, 103 Misc. 2d 823, 825, 430 N.Y.S. 2d 904, 909 (1979).
12. See e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-80 to 84 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020 (1989);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202 (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-90-308 (1987); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 2225 (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-4.1-202 to 207 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-218 (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 9101 to 9106 (1987); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 944.512 (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3401 (1983); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 351-81
to 88 (Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 411 (Smith-
Hurd 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-7-3.7-2 (Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15 (West
Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-7319 to 73-21 (Supp. 1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 346.165 (Baldwin 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:1831 to 1839 (West 1982); MD. ANN.
CODE ART. 27, § 764 (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A, § 8 (West 1989); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 611A.68 (West 1987); MIS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-38-1 to 11 (Supp. 1989); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 595.050 (Vernon Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-104(l)(d) (1989);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1836 to 1842 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 217.265 (1986); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:4B-26 (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2969.01 to 2969.06 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275 (1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 180-7.18 (Purdon Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-25.1-1 to 12 (Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 15-59-40 to 80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-28A-1
(1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-13-201 to 208 (1980); TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 8309-1,
§§ I to 18 (Vernon Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.68.200 (Supp. 1988); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 949.165(2) (West Supp. 1989); Wvo. STAT. § 1-40-112(d) (1988).
13. Special Forfeiture of Collateral Profits of Crime Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3681-3682 (West
Supp. 1989).
14. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F.
Supp. 170, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) [hereinafter "Simon & Schuster 1"].
15. Simon & Schuster IA 916 F.2d at 779.
16. U.S. CONST. amend I. The first amendment provides, in relevant part, "Congress shall
[V/ol. I11
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nor intrusion on free expression is probably acceptable to the majority of
people at any given time. The problem, however, is that these minor
intrusions have a cumulative effect and foster a chilling effect on expres-
sion generally.
When presented with a statute which bases its criteria for applica-
tion on the content of speech, courts must search for all possible alterna-
tive means of achieving a compelling purpose without restricting speech
based on its content.' If a court determines that less restrictive alterna-
tives exist or are plausible, it must strike down the statute in its existing
form. 8 The state, of course, remains free to modify the statute so as to
cure its constitutional defects.
Because of Henry Hill's involvement with the novel Wiseguy, the
New York State Crime Victims Board ("the Board"), the agency charged
with administering section 632-a, determined that Hill's profits were sub-
ject to New York's Son of Sam law. 9 Simon & Schuster challenged the
constitutionality of section 632-a in federal court.20 The district court
and the court of appeals upheld the act.2 ' However, the courts, influ-
enced by the belief that criminals should not profit from their crimes,
failed to scrutinize the statute carefully enough to determine whether al-
tering section 632-a was the least restrictive means for achieving its pur-
pose. Had the court done so, it would have discovered flaws in the
current statute, reversed the lower court, and forced the New York State
Legislature to amend the statute to better conform to the requirements of
the first amendment.
This note examines the court's decision in Simon & Schuster v. Fis-
chetti, in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district
court's finding that section 632-a is constitutional.22 Although the social
policy of section 632-a is admirable, the Second Circuit should not have
allowed the statute to remain in its current form because it violates the
first amendment guarantees in the United States Constitution.
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech ...." Id. The first amendment applies to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
17. Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 801 (1983); see also Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, 463 U.S. 1303, 1307 (1983).
18. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90
(1960).
19. Simon & Schuster I, 916 F.2d at 780.
20. Simon & Schuster I, 724 F. Supp. at 173.
21. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 778.
22. Id. at 777.
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Wiseguy was on best-seller book lists across the country for several
weeks during 1986.23 The widely-acclaimed 24 novel resulted from a com-
bination of the efforts of Simon & Schuster, a well-known publishing
company, the Sterling Lord Agency ("Sterling Lord"), a literary agency,
Nicholas Pileggi ("Pileggi"), an author known for his organized crime
articles, and Henry Hill, a former organized crime figure. 25 Hill had
been involved with organized crime for many years.2 6 He participated in
crimes such as bribery, assault, extortion, theft, burglary, arson, drug
dealing, credit card fraud and murder.27 In 1981, Simon & Schuster
learned that Hill was assisting state and federal prosecutors under the
Federal Witness Protection Program.28 Simon & Schuster began efforts
to persuade Hill to cooperate with them in publishing a novel about or-
ganized crime in New York City. 2 9 Simon & Schuster contacted Sterling
Lord and together they obtained the services of Pileggi to help Hill create
Wiseguy.3° The publishing agreement ("the contract") between Simon &
Schuster and Sterling Lord allocated ten percent of the proceeds to Ster-
ling Lord and evenly divided the remainder between Pileggi and Hill.3
It is undisputed that Hill would not have agreed to participate in the
project without an assurance that he would be paid.32
In 1986, the Board directed Simon & Schuster to provide it with a
copy of the publishing agreement and ordered Simon & Schuster to sus-
pend payments to Sterling Lord.33 On June 15, 1987, the Board issued a
Notice and a Proposed Determination and Order to Simon & Schuster
concluding that Wiseguy was subject to the regulations promulgated in
section 632-a because it contained Hill's thoughts, feelings, opinions and
emotions about participating in criminal activities.34 The Board found
23. Simon & Schuster I, 724 F. Supp. at 172; see also N. Y. Post, Oct. 5, 1990, at 4, col. 5.
24. According to Simon & Schuster, more than 90,000 copies of Wiseguy in its trade edi-
tion were sold, and more than one million copies of the soft cover edition are in print. Simon
& Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 779.
25. Simon & Schuster I, 724 F. Supp. at 172.
26. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 779.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 779.
32. Id.
33. Simon & Schuster I, 724 F. Supp. at 172.
34. Id. at 172-73. In the Notice and Proposed Determination and Order issued to Simon
& Schuster, the Board made these additional findings: first, that a copy of the contract should
have been submitted to the Board in 1981 at the time of execution; second, that Nicholas
Pileggi is a co-author, not a representative of Hill, and that payments due him are therefore not
[Vol. I11
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that Simon & Schuster had failed to submit a copy of the publishing
agreement at the time of its execution for a determination of the applica-
bility of section 632-a.35 Moreover, the Board determined that Pileggi
was a co-author of Wiseguy, not a representative of Hill, and was there-
fore not subject to the mandate of section 632-a.36 However, because
Simon & Schuster made payments to Sterling Lord for the account of
Henry Hill, the Board found that Sterling Lord was an agent of Hill and
thus a representative under section 632-a.37 Consequently, Sterling Lord
was ordered to surrender its ten percent share of Hill's proceeds to the
Board.38  The Board also ordered Hill to remit the $96,250 previously
paid to him by Simon & Schuster.39 In the event that Hill refused to pay
the money, Simon & Schuster would be required to pay that amount to
the Board.' In addition, Simon & Schuster was ordered to turn over to
the Board all outstanding monies payable to Hill, including $27,958 held
by Simon & Schuster, as well as any future royalties payable to him or
his representatives under the publishing agreement.41 Because neither
Simon & Schuster nor any other person requested any fact-finding, the
Proposed Determination and Order became the Final Determination and
Order of the Board on July 15, 1987, in conformity with the Notice
served by the Board.42
In response to the Board's order, Simon & Schuster brought an ac-
tion under 42 U.S.C. § 198313 in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York seeking declaratory and injunctive re-
lief." Simon & Schuster asserted that section 632-a violated the first
subject to the mandate of section 632-a; and finally, that Sterling Lord may apply to the Board
for payment of necessary expenses for the production of monies paid into the escrow account
to be established by the Board. Simon & Schuster I1, 916 F.2d at 780.
35. Simon & Schuster 1, 724 F. Supp. at 173.
36. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 780.
37. Simon & Schuster I, 724 F. Supp. at 173. Payments made to a representative of an
accused or a criminal under a contract subject to section 632-a must also be deposited into the
escrow account. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632(a)(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990). See infra note
50.
38. Simon & Schuster 1, 724 F. Supp. at 173.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 780. At this time, the Board is still investigating
whether Hill received any payments in connection with the film version of the book, entitled
GoodFellas (Warner Bros. 1990). Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1990, at B5, col. 1. See also N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 4, 1990, at 1, col. 5.
42. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 780.
43. Id
44. Simon & Schuster sought an order declaring section 632-a violative of the first and
fourteenth amendments "on its face and as applied," and an injunction prohibiting the Board
"from taking any steps to apply or enforce" section 632-a. Id.
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amendment guarantee of freedom of expression and the fourteenth
amendment because it was unnecessarily vague and overbroad.4" Simon
& Schuster claimed that section 632-a "imposes a direct restriction on
speech, is therefore subject to strict scrutiny, and cannot survive" under
such a standard."
After the Board filed an answer, both sides filed cross-motions for
summary judgment.47 The district court granted the Board's motion for
summary judgment and denied Simon & Schuster's motion for the same
relief.4" Simon & Schuster appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit.49
III. BACKGROUND: THE SON OF SAM LAW
New York Executive Law section 632-a,5° commonly referred to as
45. Brief for Appellees at 2, 19, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 779 (2d
Cir. 1990) (No. 89-9192).
46. Simon & Schuster I, 916 F.2d at 778. Specifically, Simon & Schuster asserted that
section 632-a has a chilling effect on books about crime because their authors, as well as those
whose cooperation is necessary to complete the books, will fear that their profits will be subject
to section 632-a. Simon & Schuster , 724 F. Supp. at 173 (Profits may be either depleted or
completely dissipated by one or more civil judgments against them or, at the very least, with-
held for five years). Simon & Schuster further alleged that section 632-a affects editorial deci-
sions resulting in self-censorship of certain subject matter covered by section 632-a. Id. The
Board contended that section 632-a does not burden free speech in any way, imposes only an
incidental burden if it burdens free speech at all, and, in any event, furthers a compelling state
interest in a narrowly tailored manner. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 778.
47. Id at 780.
48. Id at 778.
49. Id.
50. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990) (Entitled "Distribution of
Moneys Received as a Result of the Commission of Crime"):
1. Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other legal en-
tity contracting with any person or the representative or assignee of any person, ac-
cused or convicted of a crime in this state, with respect to the reenactment of such
crime, by way of a movie, book, magazine article, tape recording, phonograph rec-
ord, radio or television presentation, live entertainment of any kind, or from the
expression of such accused or convicted person's thoughts, feelings, opinions or emo-
tions regarding such crime, shall submit a copy of such contract to the board and pay
over to the board any moneys which would otherwise, by terms of such contract, be
owing to the person so accused or convicted or his representatives. The board shall
deposit such moneys in an escrow account for the benefit of and payable to any
victim or the legal representative of any victim of crimes committed by: (i) such
convicted person; or (ii) by such accused person, but only if such accused person is
eventually convicted of the crime and provided that such victim, within five years of
the date of the establishment of such escrow account, brings a civil action in a court
of competent jurisdiction and recovers a money judgment for damages against such
person or his representatives.
2. The board, at least once every six months for five years from the date it
receives such moneys, shall cause to have published a legal notice in newspapers of
general circulation in the county wherein the crime was committed and in counties
contiguous to such county advising such victims that such escrow moneys are avail-
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able to satisfy money judgments pursuant to this section. For crimes committed in a
county located within a city having a population of one million or more, the notice
provided for in this section shall be in newspapers having general circulation in such
city. The board may, in its discretion, provide for such additional notice as it deems
necessary.
3. Upon dismissal of charges or acquittal of any accused person the board shall
immediately pay over to such accused person the moneys in the escrow account es-
tablished on behalf of such accused person.
4. Upon a showing by any convicted person that five years have elapsed from
the establishment of such escrow account and further that no actions are pending
against such convicted person pursuant to this section, the board shall immediately
pay over any moneys in the escrow account to such person or his legal representa-
tives.
5. For purposes of this section, a person found not guilty as a result of the
defense of mental disease or defect pursuant to section 30.05 of the penal law shall be
deemed to be a convicted person.
6. Whenever it is found, pursuant to article seven hundred thirty of the crimi-
nal procedure law, that a person accused of a crime is unfit to proceed as a result of
mental disease or defect because such person lacks capacity to understand the pro-
ceedings against him or to assist in his own defense, the board shall bring an action of
interpleader pursuant to section one thousand six of the civil practice law and rules
to determine disposition of the escrow account.
7. Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of the estates, powers and trusts
law or the civil practice law and rules with respect to the timely bringing of an ac-
tion, the five year period provided for in subdivision one of this section shall not
begin to run until an escrow account has been established.
8. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section the board shall
make payments from an escrow account to any person accused or convicted of crime
upon the order of a court of competent jurisdiction after a showing by such person
that such moneys shall be used for the exclusive purpose of retaining legal represen-
tation at any stage of the criminal proceedings against such person, including the
appeals process. The board may in its discretion and after notice to the victims of the
crime make payments from the escrow account to a representative of any person
accused or convicted of a crime for the necessary expenses of the production of the
moneys paid into the escrow account, provided the board finds that such payments
would be in the best interests of the victims of the crime and would not be contrary
to public policy. The total of all payments made from the escrow account under this
subdivision shall not exceed one-fifth of the total moneys paid into the escrow ac-
count and available to satisfy civil judgments obtained by the victims of the crime.
9. Any action taken by any person accused or convicted of a crime, whether by
way of execution of a power of attorney, creation of corporate entities or otherwise,
to defeat the purpose of this section shall be null and void as against the public policy
of this state.
10. For purposes of this section:
(a) Victim shall mean a person who suffers personal, physical, mental, or emo-
tional injury, or pecuniary loss as a direct result of the crime.
(b) A person convicted of a crime shall include any person convicted of a
crime in this state either by entry of a plea of guilty or by conviction after trial and
any person who has voluntarily and intelligently admitted the commission of a crime
for which such person is not prosecuted.
11. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, claims on moneys in the es-
crow account shall have the following priorities:
(a) Payments ordered by the board or a court pursuant to subdivision eight of
this section;
(b) Subrogation claims of the state pursuant to section six hundred thirty-four
of this article in an amount not exceeding one-half of the net amount of the civil
1991)
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the Son of Sam law,51 was enacted to prevent criminals from profiting
from a reenactment of their crimes in the media52 without first assuring
the victims of such crimes adequate compensation for their injuries.5
Prior to the enactment of New York Executive Law section 632-a, crime
victims had no effective means of redress against a criminal who profited
by reenacting, in some form of media, the crimes they committed. 54 Sec-
tion 632-a requires that if a person accused or convicted of a crime enters
into a contract relating to the reenactment of the person's thoughts, feel-
ings, opinions or emotions regarding such crime, a copy of the contract
must be submitted to the Board.55 If the Board determines that the con-
judgment obtained by a victim which is payable directly to the victim from the es-
crow account;
(c) Civil judgments of the victims of the crime;
(d) Other judgment creditors or persons claiming moneys through the person
accused or convicted of a crime who present lawful claims, including state or local
government tax authorities;
(e) The person accused or convicted of the crime.
No payment shall be made out of the escrow account where such payment
would be in derogation of claims, either presented or pending, entitled to a higher
priority under this subdivision. The board may bring an action of interpleader pur-
suant to section one thousand six of the civil practice law and rules or an action for a
declaratory judgment where it cannot determine the priority of claims and the proper
disposition of the escrow account.
Moneys in the escrow account shall not be subject to execution, levy, attach-
ment or lien except in accordance with the priority of claims established in this sub-
division.
12. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the board shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction and control, as escrow agent, over any moneys subject to this sec-
tion. No distribution of moneys in such escrow accounts shall be made except by
determination and order of the board, pursuant to the provisions of this section and
the board's rules and regulations. Any party aggrieved by a final determination and
order of the board under this section may seek judicial review of such decision pursu-
ant to article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules.
51. Section 632-a was passed in response to the large monetary offers made to David
Berkowitz and his attorney for the rights to Berkowitz's story. Fedler, When Headlines Are
Bought, BARRISTER, Fall 1980, at 15.
52. See N.Y. EXEC LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990), supra note 50.
53. Senator Emmanuel R. Gold, the law's sponsor, stated:
It is abhorrent to one's sense of justice and decency that an individual, such as
[Berkowitz,] the forty-four caliber killer, can expect to receive large sums of money
for his story once he is captured - - while five people are dead, other people were
injured as a result of his conduct. This bill would make it clear that in all criminal
situations, the victim must be more important than the criminal.
Memorandum of Senator Emmanuel R. Gold, reprinted in 1977 NEW YORK STATE LEG-
ISLATIVE ANNUAL 267. It is clear from section 632-a's title, "Distribution of Monies Re-
ceived as a Result of the Commission of a Crime," and its structure, that the main objective of
the statute is assuring victims adequate compensation. See supra note 50.
54. Note, Criminal Antiprofit Laws: Some Thoughts in Favor of Their Constitutionality, 76
CALIF. L. REV. 1353, 1355 n.12 (1988).
55. Section 632-a also applies to people who "voluntarily admit" the commission of a
crime, as well as people who are found not guilty by reason of "mental disease or defect."
N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 632-a(5), (10)(b) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990).
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tract is subject to section 632-a, all proceeds due to the criminal under
the contract must be paid to the Board.5 6 The Board then places the
money in an escrow account for five years, and publishes notices advising
victims that such money is available to them. 7 Victims or their estates
have five years from the date of the establishment of the escrow account
to bring a civil tort action against the criminal and obtain a judgment. 58
If a victim secures a civil judgment against the criminal,59 the Board may
satisfy the judgment by paying the victim' out of the funds in the escrow
account.61 If a civil action is not brought within five years from the date
the escrow account is established, the money in the account is then re-
turned to the criminal.
62
By alerting victims to the existence of the escrow account estab-
lished by the Board,63 section 632-a apprises a victim, before filing suit,
as to whether there will be money available to satisfy a civil judgment. 
6
Moreover, the criminal is prevented from spending the money before a
56. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 778-79.
57. Id.; see also N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l) & (2) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990). Sec-
tion 632-a "does not increase the substantive rights of the victim but ensures the presence of a
fund from which the victim's money judgments" may be satisfied. Note, Compensating the
Victim from the Proceeds of the Criminal's Story: The Constitutionality of the New York Ap-
proach, 14 COLUM. J.L. & SoC.. PROBS. 93, 95 (1978).
58. Section 632-a creates a new in rem cause of action with a five-year statute of limita-
tions, but limits recovery of any monetary judgment in an action that otherwise would have
been barred by the statute of limitations to the proceeds from the escrow account. Barrett v.
Wojowicz, 66 A.D.2d 604, 612, 414 N.Y.S.2d 350, 355 (1979).
59. Civil judgments rank third in the order of priority of claims that can be paid out of the
escrow account. The order of priority of claims that may be paid out of the escrow account is
as follows: (1) attorney's fees granted by a court of competent jurisdiction for representation
of the accused at any stage of the criminal proceedings and expenses allowed by the Board for
the production of moneys paid into the escrow account, the total of which may not exceed one-
fifth of the escrow account; (2) subrogation claims of the state for payments made to a victim,
not to exceed one-half of the civil judgment obtained by a victim; (3) victims' civil judgments;
(4) judgments of other creditors and claims of persons presenting lawful demands through the
person accused or convicted of the crime, including the demands of tax authorities; and (5) the
claims of the person accused or convicted of the crime. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1 l)(a)-(e)
(McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990); Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 779.
60. Or by paying the victim's family or estate, if either one brings a suit. N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 632-a(10)(a) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990).
61. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 779; see also N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKin-
ney 1982 & Supp. 1990) supra note 50.
62. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(4) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990). See supra note 50.
63. The Board shall cause to have published a legal notice in newspapers of general circu-
lation in the county wherein the crime was committed as well as in counties contiguous to that
county, advising victims that the escrow monies are available to them to satisfy money judg-
ments. The Board must publish these notices at least once every six months for five years from
the date it receives the money. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(2) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990).
64. Id.
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judgment is rendered.65
In its first eleven years of operation, the Board has invoked the Son
of Sam law ten times.66 Of those ten proceedings, only five resulted in
the creation of escrow accounts. 67 Three of the five proceedings involved
the same criminal.68
IV. THE LAW PERTAINING TO THE RESTRICTION OF SPEECH
Before the court analyzes the restriction imposed on speech, it must
first decide if the speech being regulated has been found by the Supreme
Court to be within the area of speech protected by the first amendment.69
Several well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech such as fraud-
ulent misrepresentation, obscenity and advocacy of imminent lawless be-
havior are examples of such unprotected classes of speech.7' If the
speech falls into one of these categories of unprotected speech, the court's
analysis ends.71 If the court finds that the speech in question does not fall
into one of these unprotected categories, the court must then decide what
level of scrutiny to apply to it.
72
The principal inquiry in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to
section 632-a is whether the regulation is content-neutral or content-
based. 73 Content-based restrictions are subject to a higher level of scru-
65. The defendant does have the ability to use money held by the Board in the escrow
account for retaining legal representation. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632(a)(8) (McKinney 1982 &
Supp. 1990). "Such costs might easily consume the larger part of an escrow account, leaving
little for the satisfaction of a victim's money judgment." Note, Compensating the Victim from
the Proceeds of the Criminal's Story-The Constitutionality of the New York Approach, 14
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 93, 95 n.9 (1978).
66. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 787.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (footnote omitted). The
Supreme Court has stated that "it is well understood that the right of free speech is not abso-
lute at all times and under all circumstances." Id. at 571.
70. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at
571-72 (footnote omitted). "It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality. Id. at 572 (footnotes omitted). Those areas are excluded from first amendment pro-
tection because they do nothing to advance the goal of the speech clause of first amendment:
"to assure a society in which 'uninhibited, robust, and wide open' public debate concerning
matters of public interest would thrive, for only in such a society can a healthy representative
democracy flourish." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127 (1976) (citations omitted).
71. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (footnote omitted).
72. Id.
73. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2754 (1989) (citing Clark v. Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984)).
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tiny than other restrictions on speech.74 The controlling consideration in
determining the level of scrutiny to apply is the government's purpose in
enacting the regulation. 7 The court must determine "whether [or not]
the government has adopted a regulation because of disagreement with
the message it conveys."' 76 To qualify as content-neutral, speech restric-
tions must be "justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech."177 A regulation which serves purposes unrelated to the content
of expression is deemed neutral, even though it has the incidental effect
of interfering with some speakers or messages.78 To qualify as content-
based, speech restrictions must be the result of the ideas or information
contained in the regulation.79
There is no question that the speech regulated by section 632-a is
protected. 0 In addition, section 632-a is obviously a content-based re-
striction because its application depends on the subject matter of the
speech."' Therefore, section 632-a must withstand strict scrutiny to be
constitutional.8 2
For New York to enforce section 632-a, the state must first prove
that the interest sought to be furthered by section 632-a is compelling 3
and not merely legitimate.8 4 Secondly, it must demonstrate that the
means used to achieve that goal are necessary to accomplish that interest.
The state must also show that an alternative form of regulation which
imposes less of a hindrance on first amendment rights would not serve
the same interest.8 5 Content-based regulations are subjected to the high-
est scrutiny to ensure the strictest adherence to the underlying values of
the first amendment.
74. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981); see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976).
75. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2754.
76. Id. (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984)).
77. Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (citing Virginia Pharmacy
Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (emphasis added)).
See also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1988).
78. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-48.
79. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2536 (1989).
80. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 782.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); see also Sherbert v. Vetoer, 374 U.S. 398,
403 (1963).
84. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463
(1958)).
85. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960).
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V. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION
In a two-to-one decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit upheld the constitutionality of New York Executive Law
section 632-a.16 The majority agreed that section 632-a imposes a direct
burden on speech and therefore is subject to strict scrutiny.8" Applying
the requirements of strict scrutiny to section 632-a, the court found that
the statute survived the test and was therefore constitutional.8" In his
dissent, Judge Newman concluded that section 632-a did not meet the
strict scrutiny test and that it should therefore have been declared
unconstitutional.8 9
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority held that section 632-a should be subjected to strict
scrutiny because the governmental interest advanced by the statute bears
a direct relation to speech.9 Section 632-a "burdens directly the speech
of those who wish to tell (and sell) the stories of their crimes." 9' The
court relied on Meyer v. Grant,92 in which the United States Supreme
Court found that a denial of payment for expressive activity constituted a
direct burden on that activity.93 Addressing Meyer, the majority stated:
The statute examined in Meyer allowed proposals to
amend the Colorado constitution to be placed on the ballot at a
general election if a sufficient number of people signed an initia-
tive petition. The same statute made it a felony to pay petition
circulators. The Supreme Court, after concluding that Meyer
involved a restriction subject to "exacting scrutiny," held that
"[tihe Colorado statute prohibiting the payment of petition cir-
culators imposes a burden on political expression that the State
86. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 784.
87. Id. at 781-82.
88. Id. at 784.
89. Id at 784-87 (Newman, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 781.
91. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 781. This rejects the standard the district court
applied to section 632-a. The district court tested section 632-a under the standards estab-
lished in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), which involved a statute aimed at
prohibiting the destruction of draft cards and therefore was not directed at speech, although it
imposed an incidental burden on speech. The district court applied this standard despite the
Supreme Court's requirement "that the governmental interest in question be unconnected to
expression in order to come under O'Brien's less demanding rule." Simon & Schuster II, 916
F.2d at 781 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2541 (1989)).
92. 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
93. Id. at 422-24.
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has failed to justify." '94
The majority found that section 632-a has the effect of excluding
from circulation the expression of criminals who would write about their
crimes if they were assured of payment.95 Thus, the majority considered
section 632-a a content-based exclusion.96 The majority also determined
that section 632-a singles out the media for differential treatment based
on expressive content, because no assets other than those derived from
the recounting of the criminal's story are subject to attachment in the
manner provided by the statute.97 The court reasoned that such differen-
tial treatment must also survive strict scrutiny, demonstrating both a
compelling state interest and legislation narrowly constructed to achieve
its purpose.98
In order for the state to enforce such a restriction it must therefore
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and that the regulation is narrowly drawn to achieve that goal. 99 The
majority found that New York had a compelling state interest in assuring
that a criminal does not profit from the exploitation of his or her crime
while the victims of that crime are in need of compensation due to their
victimization."°° The majority reasoned that a compelling social interest
is served by preventing criminals from profiting at the expense of victims
who are in need of compensation and seek restitution.' °1
In order to support its determination that a compelling state interest
brought about the enactment of section 632-a, the majority referred to
the statute's legislative history:
Currently a person may commit a crime causing much
damage and personal injury, and then gain substantial financial
benefits related to resulting publicity. This bill will ensure that
monies received by the criminal under such circumstances shall
first be made available to recompense the victims of that crime
for their loss and suffering. The requirement of a civil action
will prevent the abuse of this privilege.'0 2
94. Simon & Schuster H, 16 F.2d at 781 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420, 428
(1988)).
95. Id. at 782.
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227-31 (1987)).
98. Id. at 782 (citing Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231
(1987)).
99. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
100. Simon & Schuster A, 916 F.2d at 782.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 782 (citing Assembly Bill Memorandum Re: A 9019, July 15, 1977, reprinted in
Legislative Bill Jacket, 1977 N.Y. LAWS 823).
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For additional support, the majority referred to the Division of
Criminal Justice Services as proof of the compelling state interest section
632-a was enacted to serve:
Though hardly a new phenomenon, there has been a re-
cent realization by the general public that where a defendant is
a well-known personality or the crime with which he is charged
is one that has aroused a high degree of public interest, he is in
a position to make a considerable amount of money from arti-
cles, books or television accounts of his life, times and
crimes. . . . [T]his bill takes cognizance of the situation and
seeks to redirect the money flow from the criminal to his vic-
tims. As an expression of the concept of simple justice it can-
not be faulted. It is merely another facet of the oft-repeated
maxim that crime does not (or should not) pay.
10 3
The majority found that section 632-a serves a compelling state in-
terest."° Specifically, the statute assures that money is set aside out of
the profits derived by criminals from the exploitation of their crimes and
made available to pay off judgments recovered by the victims of the
crime they exploited.10 5
Next, the majority examined whether section 632-a is narrowly tai-
lored to New York's interest in preventing criminals from profiting from
their publications until their victims have had a chance to bring an action
for restitution."° The majority concluded that section 632-a is narrowly
tailored to meet the state's interest. 07 The majority found that the stat-
ute correctly recognizes that the only way for a criminal to profit from
his or her crime, other than by the proceeds directly from it, is to reenact
it through some form of the media. 108 Additionally, the majority stated
that the sole asset of most criminals is the right to recount the story of
their crime."o Therefore, the majority concluded that the criminal's first
amendment right to speak is restricted only as a consequence of his or
her inability to profit until the victim has had a chance to make a claim
for restitution." 0 However, the majority merely examined the benefits
103. Id. at 783 (citing Memorandum from Robert Schlanger, Division of Criminal Justice
Services, to Judah Gribetz (August 3, 1977)), reprinted in Legislative Bill Jacket, 1977 N.Y.
LAWS 823).
104. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 783.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 783-84.
107. Id. at 784.
108. Id. at 783.
109. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 783.
110. Id.
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New York would receive with and without section 632-a in existence.1"'
Absent from the majority's opinion was any significant exploration of
possible alternatives New York might have used.
Finally, the majority rebutted Simon & Schuster's argument that
New York already has adequate means to provide restitution to victims
of crimes through New York Civil Practice Law & Rules article 62, a
general statutory provision for attachment in New York." 12 The major-
ity responded by claiming that article 62 is too limited to provide the
same remedies afforded by section 632-a.
1 13
Simon & Schuster then claimed that section 632-a is underinclu-
sive" 4 as applied in this case "because it is addressed to only one kind of
book and the royalties derived therefrom." ' " The majority responded
by restating that section 632-a is narrowly tailored to the state's compel-
ling interest in compensating crime victims from the criminals' proceeds
derived from the sale of their stories." 6 The majority added that pay-
ments "for expertise, royalties from books that do not describe crime
victims, and any other income and assets of criminals may be reached in
other ways.""17
Simon & Schuster's final claim was that section 632-a is overinclu-
sive" 8 in its application to publications which constitute only a small
portion of the subject matter and in reaching payments constituting the
entire compensation for the "labors of authorship rather than the prop-
erty of the victim or the fruits of unjust enrichment."' ' The majority
responded by claiming that criminals are not prohibited from speaking
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 783. A statute is underinclusive if it burdens more
speech than is necessary to achieve its goals. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980) (stat-
ute which prohibits picketing of residences while exempting peaceful labor picketing was un-
derinclusive because it made no attempt to distinguish among the various sorts of nonlabor
picketing on the basis of the harms they would cause on the privacy interest). The Court in
Carey based its analysis on the equal protection clause rather than on the first amendment.
However, as the concurring opinion recognizes, this is essentially another way of articulating
the content-neutrality requirement of the first amendment. Id. at 471-72 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
115. Simon & Schuster I, 916 F.2d at 784.
116. Id. at 783.
117. Id. at 784.
118. Id. A statute is overinclusive if it unnecessarily reaches protected areas of speech be-
yond what is necessary to achieve its purpose. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980)
(statute overinclusive because it broadly permits all peaceful labor picketing notwithstanding
the disturbances it would likely cause).
119. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 784.
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about their crimes.' 2° Section 632-a merely ties up the criminal's pro-
ceeds until the victims have had a chance to claim compensation. 12' Fur-
thermore, the majority added that the criminals' income is derived from
the notoriety of their crimes rather than from their labors.
12 2
B. The Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Judge Newman approved of section 632-a's purpose
and stated his belief that the New York legislature had good intentions
when it enacted the statute.123 However, he concluded that section 632-a
violates the first amendment and deprives the public of "valuable writ-
ings about activities of high public interest."
' 124
Judge Newman agreed with the majority in its conclusion that the
constitutionality of section 632-a should be subjected to strict scrutiny
because it "imposes such a direct burden on free expression."'' 25 He also
agreed that, under a standard of strict scrutiny, the challenged statute
must be "narrowly tailored to advance important governmental interests
and that any distinction made by the statute concerning speech in general
or speech of particular content must be 'necessary to serve a compelling
state interest' and 'narrowly drawn to achieve that end.' ",126 However,
Judge Newman concluded that section 632-a failed to meet these
requirements. 127
Judge Newman agreed that section 632-a was content-based.'
2
1
Rather than requiring that all payments made to criminals be placed in
escrow for the benefit of crime victims, the statute applies only to pay-
ments made to those criminals who re-create their crimes in books or
other forms of media. 129 Moreover, section 632-a does not apply to all
criminals who write books.' 30 Rather, it only applies to those criminals
whose books express their thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions re-
garding their crimes.' 3 '
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Simon & Schuster I, 916 F.2d at 784 (Newman, J., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422-24 (1988)).
126. Simon & Schuster 1, 916 F.2d at 784-85 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing Arkansas
Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)).
127. Simon & Schuster 11, 916 F.2d at 785 (Newman, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. According to Judge Newman, someone like John Ehrlichman could write a novel
which would sell more because of his connection with the "Watergate" crimes, without con-
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Judge Newman illustrated section 632-a's content-based application
by citing Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis.'32 In Children of Bed-
ford, two chapters of Jean Harris's autobiography contained references to
her crime for which the Board held her to be subject to section 632-a.'
33
Judge Newman remarked that if Harris' book had contained only com-
mentary regarding her conditions in prison, then her royalties, although
enhanced by the crime, would not have been subject to section 632-a.'
34
The dissent disagreed with the majority's two responses to the con-
tent-based discrimination of section 632-a.' 35  First, Judge Newman
claimed that the majority's response was circular in that it "defines the
state interest being advanced in terms of the statute's [section 632-a]
scope, thereby reaching the circular result that the statute is precisely
tailored to the state's objectives."' 36 The dissent argued that the court
should focus specifically on whether New York can achieve its purpose
only by withholding payments to criminals who write books about their
crimes rather than focusing merely on whether crime victims are bene-
fited by the statute.'
37
Judge Newman disagreed with the factual ground upon which the
majority upheld the content-based discrimination of section 632-a;
namely, that the sole asset of most criminals is the right to tell the story
of their crimes.' 31 Judge Newman believed that "very few criminals have
a crime story worth selling and that their number is far less than the sum
of criminals with assets independent of their crime proceeds plus impov-
erished criminals in possession of such proceeds when arrested.', 31 Fur-
thermore, even if the sole asset of most criminals is the right to tell the
cern that his royalties would be held for five years in order to pay victims or other creditors.
Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 785 (Newman, J., dissenting).
132. Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 143 Misc. 2d 999, 541 N.Y.S.2d 894 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct., 1989), aff'd, 556 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1st Dept. 1990).
133. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 785 (Newman, J., dissenting). Jean Harris, the for-
mer headmistress at the prestigious Madeira School, was convicted in 1981 of second-degree
murder for the killing of diet doctor Herman Tarnower, her lover of ten years. Harris is
currently serving fifteen years to life at the Bedford Hills Correctional Facility. Harris was
permitted to keep $35,000 for granting Good Housekeeping the serialization of her book,
"Stranger in Two Worlds," about her life in prison. The few sentences from the approximately
5,000 word article, entitled "My Life in Prison" which refer to Harris' thoughts and feelings
regarding her crime were determined by the New York State Supreme Court to be "merely
incidental and de minimus and do not 'make up the core of the work around which the narra-
tive is structured.' " N.Y.L.J., April 2, 1990, at 25, col. 3.
134. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 785 (Newman, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 785 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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story of their crimes, that observation, according to Judge Newman,
would not validate New York's content-based regulation of speech.'o
Judge Newman relied on Arkansas Writer's Project, Inc. v. Ragland 4 ' to
support his view that New York cannot select speech of a particular con-
tent for regulation just because it has not chosen to regulate all profits
criminals make from telling the story of their crimes.14 2
Like the majority, the dissent recognized that a content-based re-
striction will be invalidated if the legitimate state objective can be
achieved by a reasonably available alternative means which is not based
on the content of the speech. 143 New York has attachment laws 1" which
could be used by crime victims to secure the profits realized by
criminals. 4 ' The majority found that such attachment laws are too lim-
ited because they apply only to defendants who meet numerous crite-
ria. 146 Judge Newman concluded that rather than selecting books about
crime for special regulation the attachment laws should be broadened as
required by the first amendment. 147
Judge Newman refuted the majority's reliance on New York's inter-
est in relieving victims of the discomfort from knowing that criminals are
profiting from their crimes.14 He noted that the first amendment does
not permit government to alleviate public outrage or victim outrage by
regulating books and other forms of expression. 149  Furthermore,
although section 632-a may deter publications by criminals recounting
their crimes, it does not prevent such writings.' 5° Criminals, and those
who facilitate their writing, may still publish accounts of their criminal
activities so long as they are willing to wait five years to receive their
profits.' 15
140. Id.
141. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
142. Simon & Schuster 11, 916 F.2d at 786 (Newman, J., dissenting). In Arkansas Writers'
Project, the United States Supreme Court invalidated as violative of the first amendment an
Arkansas tax statute which discriminated among the types of publications which could be
taxed to raise revenue. Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 234.
143. Simon & Schuster I1, 916 F.2d at 786 (Newman, J., dissenting).
144. N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICE LAW & RULES art. 62 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1990). See
infra note 158.
145. Simon & Schuster I1, 916 F.2d at 786 (Newman, J., dissenting).
146. Id. The majority viewed New York's attachment laws as too restrictive, making re-
covery by many crime victims who would otherwise recover under section 632-a virtually
impossible. Simon & Schuster H, 916 F.2d at 783.
147. Id. at 786 (Newman, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 784.
149. Id. at 786 (Newman, J., dissenting).
150. Id.
151. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 783.
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Judge Newman found other aspects of section 632-a "highly offen-
sive" to the first amendment."5 2 Requiring publishers to submit con-
tracts which involve those accused of crimes will deter publishers from
making advance payments to accused authors in order to avoid the possi-
bility that the author claiming to be innocent will later be convicted."5 '
In short, prohibiting monetary advances deters innocent people falsely
accused of crimes from writing books.15 4 Also, the threat of holding a
publisher liable for any payments later determined to be covered by sec-
tion 632-a, where the author declines to turn such payments over to the
Board, may keep publishers from advancing funds to authors.' 55 Hold-
ing publishers liable could lead to decisions not to "publish books of high
public interest."' 56 Moreover, Judge Newman claimed that the statute's
broad coverage of contracts and payments for books "that include only a
brief reference to an author's crime or even to his 'thoughts' about his
crime will inevitably tend to impel publishers to purge manuscripts of all
material arguably within the scope of the statute in order to escape its
coverage and the risk of retroactive liability. "157
Additionally, Judge Newman stated that New York already has
crime-restitution laws' which provide crime victims with a means to
152. Id.
153. Id
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Simon & Schuster I, 916 F.2d at 787. Hill would not have participated in the publish-
ing of Wiseguy had he not been assured payment. Id. at 779.
157. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 787 (Newman, J., dissenting). Not all works con-
taining a brief reference to the criminal's thoughts have been held subject to section 632-a.
The few sentences from the approximately 5,000 word article containing Jean Harris' thoughts
and feelings regarding her crime were determined by the New York State Supreme Court to be
"merely incidental and de minimus and do not 'make up the core of the work around which
the narrative is structured.'" N.Y.L.J., April 2, 1990, at 25, col. 3. See supra note 133.
158. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.27 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1990) (Entitled "Restitution and
Reparation") states:
1. In addition to any of the dispositions authorized by this article [article 60
"Authorized dispositions of offenders"], the court shall consider restitution to the
victim of the crime and may require restitution as part of the sentence imposed upon
a person convicted of an offense, and after providing the district attorney with an
opportunity to be heard in accordance with the provisions of this subdivision, require
the defendant to make restitution of the fruits of his offense or reparation for the loss
or damage caused thereby. The district attorney shall where appropriate advise the
court at the time of sentencing that the victim seeks restitution, the extent of injury
or economic loss or damage of the victim, and the amount of restitution sought by
the victim in accordance with his responsibilities under subdivision two of section
390.50 of the criminal procedure law and article twenty-three of the executive law.
The court shall hear and consider the information presented by the district attorney
in this regard.
2. Whenever the court requires restitution or reparation to be made, the court
must make a finding as to the fruits of the offense or the loss or damage caused by the
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receive restitution from their perpetrators. 5 9 As in the case of New
York's attachment law, Judge Newman contended that if the restriction
needs strengthening to increase its effectiveness, the New York legisla-
ture should adopt such reforms, rather than enacting a statute which
violates the first amendment.' 6°
Finally, Judge Newman questioned the effectiveness of section 632-
a. He noted that in the first eleven years of its operation, the statute had
produced only five escrow accounts, three of which involved the same
criminal. 16' Judge Newman concluded that the societal benefit from the
books which would have been published were it not for section 632-a
outweighs any benefit to the "handful of victims" who have received
offense. If the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such finding or
upon request by the defendant, the court must conduct a hearing upon the issue in
accordance with the procedure set forth in section 400.30 of the criminal procedure
law.
3. The provisions of sections 420.10, 420.20 and 420.30 of the criminal proce-
dure law shall apply in the collection and remission of restitution and reparation.
4. For purposes of the imposition, determination and collection of restitution
or reparation, as provided in this chapter, the term "offense" shall include the offense
for which a defendant was convicted, as well as any other offense that is part of the
same criminal transaction or that is contained in any other accusatory instrument
disposed of by any plea of guilty by the defendant to an offense.
5. (a) Except upon consent of the defendant or as provided in paragraph (b)
of this subdivision, or as a condition of probation or conditional discharge as pro-
vided in paragraph (g) of subdivision two of section 65.10 of this chapter, the total
amount of restitution or reparation required by the court shall not exceed ten thou-
sand dollars in the case of a conviction for a felony, or five thousand dollars in the
case of a conviction for any offense other than a felony.
(b) The court in its discretion may impose restitution or reparation in ex-
cess of the amounts specified in paragraph (a) of this subdivision, provided however
that the amount in excess must be limited to the return of the victim's property,
including money, or the equivalent value thereof; and reimbursement for medical
expenses actually incurred by the victim prior to sentencing as a result of the offense
committed by the defendant.
6. Any payment made as restitution or reparation pursuant to this section
shall not limit, preclude or impair any liability for damages in any civil action or
proceeding for an amount in excess of such payment.
7. In the event that the court requires restitution or reparation to be made to a
person and that person dies prior to the completion of said restitution or reparation,
the remaining payments shall be made to the estate of the deceased.
8. The court shall in all cases where restitution or reparation is imposed direct
as part of the disposition that the defendant pay a designated surcharge of five per-
cent of the entire amount of a restitution or reparation payment to the official or
organization designated pursuant to subdivision eight of section 420.10 of the crimi-
nal procedure law. The designated surcharge shall not exceed five percent of the
amount actually collected.
159. Simon & Schuster 11, 916 F.2d at 787 (Newman, J., dissenting). Section 60.27 autho-
rizes sentencing judges to give redress in every case. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.27 (McKin-
ney 1987 & Supp. 1990) supra note 157.
160. Simon & Schuster I. 916 F.2d at 787 (Newman, J., dissenting).
161. Id.
[Vol. I11
SON OF SAM LAW
funds from escrow accounts set up by the Board. 162 The existing restitu-
tion statutes of New York could have sufficiently provided victims with
compensation without burdening speech.' 63
VI. ANALYSIS
A. The Court Correctly Applied Strict Scrutiny to Section 632-a
The Supreme Court has held that statutes which restrict payment
for expressive activities, thereby reducing the amount of speech, substan-
tially burden speech and require strict scrutiny.' The Court has noted
that "regulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the
basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the first
amendment." '65 By limiting its reach to certain types of expression
which "reenact" crimes or express "thoughts, feelings, opinions or emo-
tions" about crimes, section 632-a is content-based. 166 Section 632-a's
application to a particular contract depends entirely on the content of the
speech to be published.
167
Section 632-a may prevent a criminal from speaking or writing
about their crimes due to the possibility that any monies earned from
such expression may be usurped by civil actions brought against the
criminal. 68 In examining section 632-a, the Second Circuit recognized
that without a "financial incentive to relate their criminal activities, most
would-be storytellers will decline to speak or write."' 69 Section 632-a
clearly has "the effect of excluding from circulation the expression of
criminals who would write about their crimes."' 7 ° By placing special
burdens on criminal authors, or criminals who aid authors in retelling
their story and publishers willing to engage in such expression, section
632-a deters expression based on its content.17 ' Once a court finds that
speech is regulated based on its content or subject matter, strict scrutiny
must be applied. 
172
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 788-89 (1988); Meyer v. Grant, 486
U.S. 414, 422-24 (1988).
165. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984).
166. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 782.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 781.
170. Id. at 782.
171. Simon & Schuster I, 916 F.2d at 781-82.
172. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc.
v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230-31 (1987) (government scheme that exempts religious, profes-
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In addition, section 632-a is subject to strict scrutiny because it sin-
gles out those engaged in expressive activities by applying only to gains
from such activities, and not to gains from any other activities. 17 3 Sec-
tion 632-a, which applies only to persons contracting with respect to "a
movie, book, magazine article, tape recording, phonograph record, radio
or television presentation, [or] live entertainment of any kind," and not
to any other contracts, assets or monies owed to accused or convicted
persons, singles out persons engaged in expressive activity. 17 4 Only per-
sons who contract to publish or create expression are subject to the stat-
ute's burdens; businesses that contract to make payments to accused and
convicted persons for any other purposes are not affected by the stat-
ute. '75 By singling out expression for special treatment, section 632-a
creates a disincentive to write books that will be subject to its terms,
thereby deterring individuals from creating speech of specified content in
ways that generally applicable measures do not.176 No assets, other than
those derived from the retelling of the criminal's story, are subject to
attachment under the statute. 77  Such differential treatment must also
survive strict scrutiny, 178 for that treatment is based on both the subject
matter of the proposed speech and the identity of the proposed
speaker. 79 Such regulations are subject to strict scrutiny.8
B. Section 632-a Does Not Withstand Strict Scrutiny
1. Section 632-a Serves a Compelling State Interest
As previously mentioned, section 632-a serves the compelling objec-
tive of "barring criminals from profiting at the expense of victims who
are in need of compensation and press their demands for restitution."''8
sional, trade or sports journals from sales tax is a regulation based on content since officials
must scrutinize the content of the publications as a basis for imposing the tax).
173. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 782.
174. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990); see supra note 50.
175. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990).
176. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 782; see Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,
481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987).
177. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990); see supra note 50.
178. Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 231.
179. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990); see supra note 50.
180. See e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980)
(citation omitted) ("As a general matter, 'the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its con-
tent.' "); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85 (1978) (strict scrutiny for
a law prohibiting certain speakers from spending corporate money for certain purposes, since
the "legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons
may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue.").
181. Simon & Schuster 11, 916 F.2d at 782.
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Rather than suppressing speech, section 632-a serves the purpose of as-
suring "that funds are set aside out of profits derived by criminals from
the exploitation of their crimes and made available for the payment of
judgments later recovered by the victims of the crimes exploited.""8 2
Not only does section 632-a prevent the unjust enrichment of criminals,
it also decreases the likelihood that society will have to support victims of
crime through social programs, satisfies victims' sense of justice and de-
sire for retribution, and increases the criminal's awareness of the conse-
quences of his crime.'83 As previously stated, finding a compelling
interest is only one factor in allowing a content-based restriction to sur-
vive strict scrutiny.8 4 Once the court determines that section 632-a
serves a compelling state interest, it must then decide whether the statute
is necessary to achieve that interest.1
8 5
2. The Second Circuit Failed to Adequately Explore the Existence of
Less Restrictive Alternatives
In determining whether section 632-a withstands strict scrutiny,
New York must show that the "regulation is necessary to serve a compel-
ling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."
186
Having found that the statute serves a compelling state interest,8 7 the
court's evaluation of the constitutionality of section 632-a must then turn
on whether the statute is narrowly tailored towards achieving that inter-
est. 188 Where, as here, the state has imposed a content-based restriction
on speech, the least restrictive alternative requirement is extremely strict;
alternatives which are less restrictive of speech must be used if they
would accomplish the state's objective equally well.' 89
In order to evaluate the Second Circuit's application of the least re-
strictive alternative requirement in this case, a review of previous
Supreme Court decisions is necessary. In Boos v. Barry,"9 the Supreme
Court examined the constitutionality of District of Columbia Code sec-
182. Id. at 783.
183. Id. (citing Note, Criminal Antiprofit Laws: Some Thoughts in Favor of Their Constitu-
tionality, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1353, 1367 (1988) (footnotes omitted)).
184. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
403 (1963).
185. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463
(1958)).
186. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
187. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 782-83.
188. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987).
189. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90
(1960).
190. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
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tion 22-1115 which made it unlawful, within five hundred feet of a for-
eign embassy, to display any sign that tends to bring the foreign
government into "public odium" or "public dispute." '91 To determine
whether this content-based measure was narrowly tailored, the court
looked beyond existing District of Columbia law in its search for possible
less restrictive alternatives.1 92 The Court compared the law with an
analogous statute passed by Congress, which applied inside the District
of Columbia, but which was not directed at the content of the speech.
193
Rather, the federal statute was aimed at any activity having the prohib-
ited effects.' 94 The Court concluded that the availability of a Congres-
sional-type approach amply demonstrated that section 22-1115 was not
crafted with sufficient precision to withstand first amendment scrutiny.'95
Although New York's section 632-a serves a compelling interest, it, like
the District of Columbia law struck down in Boos, is not narrowly tai-
lored because less restrictive alternatives exist.'
96
Reviewing the Court's application of the least restrictive alternative
requirement in other contexts illustrates the strictness with which it is
applied in content-based cases. Both time, place, or manner restrictions
and restrictions of symbolic speech must be "narrowly tailored" to serve
legitimate government interests. 97 However, the content-neutral limita-
tion on speech need not be the least restrictive means of achieving that
interest.'98 As long as the means chosen are not substantially broader
than necessary to achieve the government's purpose, a time, place, or
manner regulation will not be invalidated simply because a court con-
cludes that the government's interest could be adequately served by some
alternative less restrictive of speech. 199
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism,2°° the Court emphasized the
higher degree of tailoring required for content-based regulations, as com-
191. Id. at 316.
192. Id. at 324.
193. Id.
194. The court found that Title 18 U. S. C. § 112 was "not narrowly directed at the content
of the speech but at any activity, including speech, that has the prohibited effects. Moreover,
section 112, unlike section 22-1115, does not prohibit picketing; it only prohibits activity un-
dertaken to 'intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass.'" Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 326 (1988).
195. Id. at 329.
196. Id.
197. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2756-57, 2758 n.6 (1989).
198. Id. at 2757-58.
199. Id. at 2758.
200. 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of a noise regulation requiring
musical performers to use a sound system and sound technician provided by the City of New
York, in order to avoid disturbing surrounding residents).
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pared with mere time, place, or manner restrictions:201
While time, place, or manner regulations must also be
'narrowly tailored' in order to survive first amendment chal-
lenge, we have never applied strict scrutiny in this context. As
a result, the same degree of tailoring is not required of these
[time, place, or manner] regulations, and least-restrictive-alter-
native analysis is wholly out of place.2"2
Ward also noted that the degree of tailoring required for judging the
validity of symbolic conduct under United States v. O'Brien2 °3 is little, if
any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restric-
tions.2"4 Both have far less stringent standards than the standard applied
to content-based restrictions.
The Ward Court implicitly recognized that the "narrowly tailored"
requirement in content-based cases calls for a sifting through of all con-
ceivable alternative means that might be less burdensome on speech.2"5
Examining all possible viable alternatives may seem impractical, yet the
task is one which a court must conscientiously seek to perform. Govern-
ment restriction of speech based on its content is tolerated in only the
rarest circumstances. The first amendment is designed to ensure "unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open" debate, creating a genuine marketplace
of ideas.2°' Content-based regulations, by eliminating or chilling speech,
hamper the dissemination of information, reduce the impact of this mar-
ketplace, and cause the public to engage in less informed decision mak-
ing.20 7 Such regulations therefore threaten the essence of a democratic
society. For this reason, statutes such as section 632-a, which restrict
speech based on its content, must be subjected to the very strictest scru-
tiny in an attempt to discover any less restrictive alternative that may
serve the state's goal equally well.
201. Id. at 2757-58.
202. Id. at 2758, n.6.
203. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding a statute which prohibited destrution of draft cards).
204. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2757 (1989) (citing Community for
Creative Non- Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984)). In order to come under O'Brien's less de-
manding rule, the Supreme Court has required "that the governmental interest in question be
unconnected to expression." Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 781 (citing Texas v. Johnson,
109 S. Ct. 2533, 2541 (1989)).
205. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2757 (1989).
206. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (citations omitted) (purpose of the first amendment is "to secure 'the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.' ").
207. Note, Criminals Selling Their Stories: The First Amendment Requires Legislative Re-
examination, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1331, 1341 (1986-87).
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The court of appeals in Simon & Schuster v. Fischetti2 °8 neglected to
use this approach in determining whether section 632-a was the least
speech restrictive alternative. The court correctly rejected application of
O'Brien, holding that strict scrutiny, rather than O'Brien's lesser stan-
dard of scrutiny, had to be applied. 2 ' However, it appears that the court
there proceeded to employ O'Brien's weaker standard with regard to less
restrictive alternatives. The majority's less restrictive alternative analysis
consisted principally of the observation that New York would be better
off with section 632-a in effect than without it.2 "0 The only alternative
the majority considered was the situation as it would exist without sec-
tion 632-a.21 ' However, the majority did respond to alternatives that the
dissent suggested and claimed would be less restrictive of speech than
section 632-a.21 2 The court failed to take into account other possible
monies a criminal might receive by participating in a witness protection
program. Such monies are outside of section 632-a's reach, yet are fully
available to victims seeking compensation.
The majority's only discussion of alternatives to section 632-a was in
response to Simon & Schuster's and the dissent's suggestion that means
less restrictive of speech were available.21 3 In response to the suggestion
that less restrictive alternatives were available because New York already
had laws allowing victims to attach a criminal's assets of criminals in-
cluding profits from a recounting of their crime, the court simply claimed
that such attachment laws were too limited.2" 4 The majority stopped its
investigatory process at this point and failed to explore the possibility of
altering section 632-a to make it less speech restrictive. 21 5 For example,
the court appeared unwilling to acknowledge the possibility that victims
may reach any of a criminal's assets in order to satisfy a civil judgment.
In contrast, dissenting Judge Newman believed that section 632-a
was not narrowly tailored to achieving its goal.2 16 He identified in gen-
eral terms a few alternatives that would be less restrictive of speech than
section 632-a.217 The existence of these alternatives was enough to inval-
idate section 632-a. Judge Newman did not examine in detail how they
208. 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3546 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1991)(No.
90-1059).
209. Simon & Schuster I, 916 F.2d at 781.
210. Id. at 781-84.
211. Id. at 783-84.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 783-84.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 786 (Newman, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 786-87.
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might work, nor did he probe for still other possible solutions.218
The dissent suggested, for example, using existing attachment laws
to secure for crime victims all profits realized by criminals, including but
not limited to profits from book publications. 219 Realizing that the ma-
jority might have had a legitimate concern that such attachment laws are
too limited, Judge Newman noted that, "If that is so, the answer required
by the first amendment is to broaden the remedies, not to select books
about crime for special regulation."22
A less restrictive alternative offered by the dissent was to use New
York's comprehensive restitution statute,2 21 which authorizes sentencing
judges in every case to order restitution.222 Although the dissent recog-
nized that a modification of New York's restitution statute might be in
order to assure that it achieves the same purpose as section 632-a, the
fact that the alternative existed was enough to invalidate the Son of Sam
law:
Nothing in the Constitution prevents [the] enactment of
such a comprehensive statute providing for restitution to crime
victims. If that statute needs strengthening to increase its effec-
tiveness, New York is free to adopt needed reforms. The issue
of how best to secure restitution for crime victims involves pol-
icy judgments for the state legislature.223
The dissent correctly recognized that the judiciary is to decide
whether section 632-a employs a technique permitted by the first
amendment.224
Unlike Judge Newman, the majority failed to carry out its responsi-
bility to search for possible less restrictive alternatives. The majority
merely affirmed that victims of crime would be better served with section
632-a in effect than without it.225 This was never in doubt. The majority
made no attempt to consider whether the statute could be altered or
amended to make it less speech restrictive. In contrast, the dissent sug-
gested less speech restrictive alternatives.
218. Id. at 785-87.
219. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 786.
220. Id.
221. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.27 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1990). See supra note 158 and
accompanying text.
222. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 787 (Newman, J., dissenting).
223. Id.
224. Id. The court's job is to ensure that the least speech restrictive alternative is used. In
our governmental scheme, courts have final authority in interpreting constitutional controver-
sies. Marbury v, Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
225. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 781-84.
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C. Alternatives Less Restrictive of Speech Available to the Court
There are several alternatives less restrictive of speech that exist
which may achieve New York's goal equally well, some of which are
content-neutral. As previously mentioned, the dissent recognized that
New York's attachment and restitution laws could achieve section 632-
a's goal.226 Addressing such laws, the majority noted that New York's
general statutory scheme for attachment in its present form is too limited
to fulfill the state's objective, for article 62:
is restricted to situations where the defendant: is a nondomicil-
iary residing outside New York or a foreign corporation not
qualified to do business in New York; is a resident or domicili-
ary who cannot be served despite diligent efforts to do so; has
disposed of, removed or secreted property or is about to do so,
with the intent to defraud creditors or frustrate a possible judg-
ment; or is defending an action based on a judgment entitled to
full faith and credit.227
These defects, however, can easily be cured by broadening article 62
so that its application, at least in lawsuits by victims of crime against the
criminal who wronged them, is not limited to one of these categories.
Strengthening New York's attachment or restitution statutes may in-
crease their effectiveness, enabling them to achieve the same objectives as
section 632-a in a content-neutral manner.
Another content-neutral suggestion is to seize all of a criminal's as-
sets for five years in the same manner as section 632-a. Necessities of life
such as money for food, transportation and housing would be exempt
from seizure. Although somewhat more severe than section 632-a, this
alternative achieves the statute's goals of providing compensation for vic-
tims and preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes while not
focusing on the content of the criminal's speech.
A further alternative to these legislative actions exists which serves
section 632-a's goal to the extent that it is to prevent criminals from prof-
iting from their crimes. That objective can be fulfilled without chilling
speech merely by people refusing to purchase criminal works, thereby
discouraging publishers from subsidizing them. If the people of New
York are truly offended by criminals profiting by the exploitation of their
crimes through the media and wish to deter such action from occurring,
let them make the decision individually and collectively. The first
226. Id. at 786-87 (Newman, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 783. See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.27 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1990) supra
note 157.
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amendment does not allow the government to make these decisions for
the people. In a free society, those decisions are properly left to the peo-
ple themselves. It is important to note that to the extent that the goal of
section 632-a is to provide victims with compensation, the above sugges-
tion fails. No specific statutory mechanism would be left in place to pro-
vide compensation for victims of crimes.22
In addition to these content-neutral alternatives, a less restrictive
content-based alternative exists; allow New York to impound a small
percentage of the criminal's profits for five years. Criminals deterred
from writing about their crimes if all of their profits would be seized to
satisfy possible civil judgments would be more likely to write about their
crimes if they could have immediate access to some of their money.
Under this proposal, even though publishers would not receive the same
amount of money they would have had the statute not been in effect, they
still have a viable financial incentive. They might thus publish works
such as Wiseguy in order to further public knowledge of criminal's
thoughts and motivations. This would be consistent with the communi-
cation industry's historic role in public debate and would also generate
publicity, both likely to lead to profits in future enterprises. Although
still focusing on the content of the criminal's speech, such statutes are
less speech restrictive than section 632-a. This is a compromise, but it
better preserves the first amendment and still substantially accomplishes
the goal of section 632-a.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's failure to invalidate section 632-a by ade-
quately searching for alternatives less restrictive of speech has potentially
grave consequences for a free society dependent on vigorous, robust de-
bate. The underlying principle of the first amendment invites discussion
of any and every topic, including crime.2 29 Criminals, no less than other
members of society, have a right to free expression. That right encom-
passes communications about their crimes, motivations, and intended
objectives. Society is well served when it learns about crime, how it is
committed, and what circumstances enhance its likelihood. That knowl-
edge enables the public to better cope with one of the most troublesome
social problems of our times.
228. Existing New York statutes, such as those involving wrongful death or other tort ac-
tion, may still provide adequate compensation to victims.
229. The goal of the first amendment is "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of social changes desired by the people." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49
(1976) (citation omitted).
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However repugnant criminals such as Henry Hill and David
Berkowitz may be, it is in our best interest to learn as much about them
as possible. Simply reading the memoirs of criminals may not provide
definitive answers to the crime problem, yet it may help us to alleviate its
impact. To deny the public that opportunity through restrictive legisla-
tion such as section 632-a only ensures an even lesser understanding of
criminal conduct. First-hand accounts provide excellent source material
for more critical social analysis.
The public interest is thus best served by allowing criminals to ex-
press themselves. It is not only mass murderers whose expression is chil-
led by statutes such as section 632-a. Had section 632-a been in effect,
the statute might have deterred publication of On Civil Disobedience by
Henry David Thoreau, who refused to pay taxes for moral and political
reasons.30 It may have also kept from publication works such as Wit-
ness by Whitaker Chambers, a Communist party member who later be-
came a government informer, and Where Do We Go From Here? by
Martin Luther King, Jr., a civil rights leader who was often jailed by
authorities for protesting segregation in the south.2 3 1
It is encouraging that on February 19, 1991, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to the Simon & Schuster case.232 Hopefully, the Court
will uphold the guarantees of the first amendment by invalidating section
632-a. This will send a clear message to legislatures, that should they
desire to enact laws with the same worthwhile purpose as section 632-a,
they will ensure that it is done in the least restrictive fashion possible.
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230. Simon & Schuster II, 916 F.2d at 787 (Newman, J., dissenting).
231. Id.
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